MA thesis
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores various responses to the mind body problem, including physicalism, panpsychism, idealism and neutral monism. I argue that none of these theories successfully resolves the mind-body problem in their current formulations. I therefore introduce the concept of ‘hyperdimensional neutral monism’ as an elaboration and exploration of neutral monism. Neutral monism states that there is a single type of neutral, ontologically primary ultimate, which both the physical and the mental supervene on (Banks, 2010). Hyperdimensional neutral monism (HNM) states that these ultimates exist in a more-than-4- dimensional realm and that the physical world of spacetime is a 4-dimensional aspect of this realm. Consciousness is the protrusion of spacetime into more than four dimensions. In order to explain these concepts, I utilize an aquatic metaphor of vortices appearing within a physical ocean. I compare HNM to panqualityism, which is another version of neutral monism (Coleman, 2014, 2016), and cosmopsychism (Shani, 2015, 2018) which relies on a similar aquatic metaphor. I argue that HNM is a viable means of addressing the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 2015, 2017, 2019).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This article would not have been possible without the support of Ben Smart & Catherine Botha who offered valuable insight and guidance throughout the process. Thank you to my good friend, Chris Vitale at the Pratt Institute for pointing me in different directions and opening my eyes to different ways of approaching this subject.
INTRODUCTION
In this Master’s dissertation I explore various approaches to addressing the mind-body problem and ultimately introduce and defend a novel response, which I call ‘hyperdimensional neutral monism’. The mind body-problem is the problem of defining the relationship between mind and body. The problem specifically concerns the relationship between the brain (or body) and consciousness (or the mind). However, it can also concern the broader nature of reality and the relationship between consciousness and the entire physical universe. 1
The mind-body problem goes beyond that of defining the neural correlates of consciousness. With the expanding field of neuroimaging, we are gaining increasingly detailed knowledge on which parts of the brain correspond to which conscious experiences, but we are no closer to understanding why a physical object such as the brain corresponds to conscious experience at all (Robinson, 2020). We could imagine an entity which is physically identical to us down to each individual atom, but which is experientially different from us, or even experientially nonexistent, as in the case of ‘philosophical zombies’, which I discuss below (Chalmers, 1996). As such, the knowledge that a specific neuron corresponds to a specific experience does not help answer the question of why there is experience in the first place.
This dissertation is divided into four main chapters. In Chapter 1, I broadly explore the mindbody problem (Chalmers, 1996, 2017b, 2019; Robinson, 2020) and the dualist response to this problem (Robinson, 2020; Lycan, 2003). In Chapter 2, I broadly explore monist responses to the mind-body problem, including physicalism (Lycan, 2003; Carrol, 2017; Chalmers, 1996, 2017b), panpsychism (Goff, 2015, Strawson, 2017, Chalmers, 2015, 2017a), idealism (Chalmers, 2019, 2017a; Downing, 2011; Kastrup, 2014 ;Shani, 2015), and neutral monism (Banks, 2010, 2014; Stubenberg, 2016; Coleman, 2016, 2017). In Chapter 3, I narrowly focus on panqualityism (Coleman, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017; Coleman & Goff, 2020) and cosmopsychism (Shani, 2015; Shani & Keppler, 2018; Kastrup, 2014, 2017a-c; 2018) in order to lay the foundations for the introduction of hyperdimensional neutral monism (Frenkel, 2022), which I explain in Chapter 4.
The mind-body problem goes beyond that of defining the neural correlates of consciousness. With the expanding field of neuroimaging, we are gaining increasingly detailed knowledge on which parts of the brain correspond to which conscious experiences, but we are no closer to understanding why a physical object such as the brain corresponds to conscious experience at all (Robinson, 2020). We could imagine an entity which is physically identical to us down to each individual atom, but which is experientially different from us, or even experientially nonexistent, as in the case of ‘philosophical zombies’, which I discuss below (Chalmers, 1996). As such, the knowledge that a specific neuron corresponds to a specific experience does not help answer the question of why there is experience in the first place.
This dissertation is divided into four main chapters. In Chapter 1, I broadly explore the mindbody problem (Chalmers, 1996, 2017b, 2019; Robinson, 2020) and the dualist response to this problem (Robinson, 2020; Lycan, 2003). In Chapter 2, I broadly explore monist responses to the mind-body problem, including physicalism (Lycan, 2003; Carrol, 2017; Chalmers, 1996, 2017b), panpsychism (Goff, 2015, Strawson, 2017, Chalmers, 2015, 2017a), idealism (Chalmers, 2019, 2017a; Downing, 2011; Kastrup, 2014 ;Shani, 2015), and neutral monism (Banks, 2010, 2014; Stubenberg, 2016; Coleman, 2016, 2017). In Chapter 3, I narrowly focus on panqualityism (Coleman, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017; Coleman & Goff, 2020) and cosmopsychism (Shani, 2015; Shani & Keppler, 2018; Kastrup, 2014, 2017a-c; 2018) in order to lay the foundations for the introduction of hyperdimensional neutral monism (Frenkel, 2022), which I explain in Chapter 4.